MONTHLY FEATURE uuu POLICE AND SECURITY uuu FEBRUARY, 1993

Dr.S.Subramanian, IPS (Retd.)

Verma Commission report has reopened the eternal question - Can assassinations be prevented? Even fatalists admit that it can be done and security specialists aver that they can assure the safety of their wards, if the latter play the game according to rules.

India lost, since independence, three of great leaders - Mahatma, Indira and Rajiv Gandhis - to the assassins. Probes indicated that there were many lapses in the security systems for these slain leaders thereby implying that these lacunae directly contributed to the fell deed.

Danger to personal safety is an occupational hazard for the political leader. Votaries of political violent movements; enemy agents; disgruntled citizens; and psychopaths have carried out successful assassinations in the past. Danger stalks the political leader because of his eminence, power and authority. Since the precise source of danger is not known, all contingencies are to be anticipated and elaborate counter measures are to be devised. These cost money and it becomes necessary to restrict the number of dignitaries who can have total protection - a security cocoon - to a few.

Professional standards demand that the high security cover be given based on ‘Indispensability Quotient’ and ‘Risk Quotient’. The former is determined on the basis of the impact the sudden death of the protected person will have on the nation and its affairs and the latter on the ‘real dangers’ facing the dignitary. Unfortunately, in our country, a third dimension, ‘Status Symbol’ has been added, making a mockery of the security arrangements.

Contributory factors for the success of assassins are : (a) lack of advance and precise intelligence; (b) inadequate and faulty risk assessment; (c) incompetence and lack of professionalism of the intelligence and security services; (d) Security systems failures; and finally (e)non-cooperation of the protected person and his associated with the security services. The first four can be remedied by upgrading the skills of the intelligence and security services and the last one calls for ‘educating the VIPs’.

Why do dignitaries play truant with the security arrangements? They find the security arrangements ‘politically’ inconvenient and unproductive. As precise source of danger is not known, security authorities make elaborate arrangements for ‘checks’ to screen out dangerous persons from getting access to the VIP. Higher the risks, greater the checks and fewer persons can get free access to the VIP. This arrangement runs counter to the political needs of the VIP - cultivation of people by meeting them, hearing them and seen by them often. Thus, security arrangements become an irritant to political needs and this creates constant friction between the ‘protected’ and his ‘protectors’. Further to given an impression of disdain to personal safety, dignitaries flout and disregard security precautions in public. To boost up their image, they often indulge in the popular pastime of ‘police bashing’. All these make the security personnel confused and bewildered, and when the ‘real crunch’ occurs, the protection arrangements crumble.

In the prevailing atmosphere of violence and lawlessness in the country, dangers to VIPs have become more pronounced. Fail proof and comprehensive protection arrangements are called for in respect of really important dignitaries. Few essential, yet simple steps given below will ensure that these VIPs are fully protected.

(a) Comprehensive security for few : Fair proof security arrangements need enormous resources in men and money. Therefore this should be restricted to a maximum of six and entrusted to a specialised central agency.

(b) Accountability of intelligence agencies : Intelligence agencies should be made responsible for generating advance intelligence regarding dangers of VIPs and for neutralising and eliminating conspiracies. They should play a more active role than being mere post offices passing papers from one to another.

(c) VIP security should come on concurrent list : VIP security, particularly of High Risk personalities, should become the joint responsibility of the Centre and the State and all expenditure on the protection of High Risk dignitaries should be borne by the centre.

(d) Revamp Civil Police : As disorder and lawlessness enhances the threat to VIPs’ security, an all out effort should be made to revamp civil police and improve its efficiency.

(e) Cooperation of the VIP : The protected person should be briefed on a daily basis about the threats affecting his security and explained the rationale behind the various security arrangements and compliance with security requirements should be made mandatory. They should be advised not to misuse security personnel for personal errands.

(f) Numbers do not enhance security : An assassin has to be lucky only once, whereas the security authorities will have to be always accurate in their anticipation of dangers and in their counter measures. This calls for high quality staff will adequate exposure to modern technology and gadgetry. Security authorities should get out of the present ‘numbers syndrome’ and reduce the number security personnel and strive for quality by enlisting better educated, technically qualified, motivated and trained personnel for VIP duties. Better team work and dedication to the task will yield good results. To inculcate sophistication in their work, selected security personnel should be sent abroad to observe their counterparts at work and pick up the nuances.

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