MONTHLY FEATURE uuu POLICE AND SECURITY uuu MAY, 1994

Dr.S.Subramanian, IPS (Retd.)

BIJBEHRA and October 22, 1993, will go down as black chapters in the glorious history of the Border Security Force (BSF), which has won a place in the hearts of the people through distinguished service winning many battle honours and achieving great heights in sports, mountaineering etc. and living up to its motto - ‘Duty unto Death’. The severe indictment of the BSF by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) should have certainly opened the eyes of the Government and all concerned. A new concept of accountability had dawned. NHRC has reiterated the eternal ethical principle that means are more important than the ends. BSF has also learnt a bitter lesson, that organisations like individuals are judged by their mistakes and not by their past achievements.

There is no need to sulk or feel despondent. NHRC has also graciously suggested that, "a thorough review should be undertaken by the government of the circumstances and conditions in which units of the Border Security Force are deployed and expected to operate in situations involving only civilian population. This directive of the NHRC should be implemented in letter and spirit.

Why incidents like BIJBEHRA occur? Due to lack of conceptual clarity at the political level; administrative errors in deploying inappropriate forces to deal with political violent movements; lack of proper training and mental preparation for the Security Forces to deal with politically violent movements; the stress factor operating on the personnel of Security Forces.

Politically violent movements are born due to the existence of political discontent which finds the available political processes inadequate to give relief and seeks redressal through violent means. As the root causes are political, the solutions are also in political processes. Unfortunately, the political leadership believes that with the use of force, politically violent movements can be put down. It is the primary duty of the Government in power to restore normalcy in the affected area. For this, the local populace are to be won over and their co-operation ensured. When State uses force to put down politically violent movements, excess use of force alienates the population and the discontent intensifies. Instead of protecting the rights, lives and properties of people; the Government becomes a party to their destruction. The first requisite therefore is to realise that political ideologies cannot be put down by force and the use of force should be limited to dealing with the criminality endemic in such situations.

To deal with the civilian population in politically violent situations, the use of Army, BSF, ITBP, SSB etc. are inappropriate. They are trained and equipped to annihilate an enemy. Their ethos is victory at all costs, while the motto should be peace at all costs. These forces cannot appreciate the need to hold their punches and adopt a cautious ‘wait and watch’ policy to enable the political opponent to come to the table. When they respond, as they are equipped only with lethal weapons, there are many avoidable deaths and grievous injuries which heightens the process of alienation. In India, other than the Civil Police, CRPF alone has the requisite training and equipment to deal with civilian population. Often in the disturbed areas, one would find the local police highly demoralised and often infected with the dissident ideology. No useful purpose will be served by jettisoning the local police. While due care should be taken to weed out infected elements, the morale should be reestablished and strengthened. Punjab has shown the way. An imaginative police leadership had rejuvenated and motivated the local police to take on the separatist elements. There is need to expand CRPF, particularly its women’s wing and the Rapid Action Force. If BSF, ITBP etc. are to be deployed, their weaponry should be changed into less lethal ones and they should be given appropriate training to deal with civilian population.

While dealing with politically sensitive situations like insurgency, secessionism, extremism etc. mere numbers alone will not do the trick. The security forces should be thoroughly briefed to understand the ‘why’ and the rationale of all operations. They should be told that they are not fighting a foreign enemy but are helping in the process of weeding out a cancerous growth from our population. They should be given adequate inputs about the genesis and growth of the violent movement, local history, customs and traditions and habits of the people so that they may not do any thing to create conditions for a conflict. The need to eschew force as the first option should be repeatedly stressed. To develop proper attitudes and behaviours, case studies of failures of the missions are to be explained to them. The need to observe ‘HUMAN RIGHTS’ in all their actions should be repeatedly emphasised.

Politically violent situations make it necessary for the security forces to deal with an invisible and cunning enemy. It is quite difficult to distinguish a friend from the foe unless one is in full command of his mental faculties. The need to have a mentally alert and energetic security force in the disturbed areas cannot be overstressed. Unfortunately, our security forces are deployed without respite in disturbed areas in inhospitable conditions. They are away from their families and normal life for years on end. Even the so called rotation of duties is from frying pan to fire - one disturbed area to a more disturbed one. There is a limit to which a normal security personnel can withstand stress. When he cracks up, errors in judgement take place and a sadistic streak surfaces. he associates all his ills with the local situation and when he gets an opportunity, he takes it on the local population. So far, no organised efforts have been made to rotate personnel, provide them with annual leave and R.R.facilities. It is time that the authorities devise a scientific method of providing these to the personnel.

In a battle, the one who pulls the trigger faster survives. In disturbed areas, the forces are too thinly spread on the ground and vital decisions are taken at a very low level of command by personnel who are not trained to take such decisions. The age-old method of security forces having the assistance of executive magistracy to deal with disorders should be reviewed and the presence of executive magistracy on the ground should be strengthened. Their services should be available round the clock to the Unit Commander for dealing with violent elements, for cordon and search operations etc. Their presence will act as a shield to protect the security forces against unfounded allegations.

Conscious efforts are to be made by the leaders of the security forces and civil administration to bring the people and security forces together through ‘cultural events’, ‘provision of medical facilities’, ‘reconstruction work’ etc. Security forces can relate to the youth well and earn their friendship. These would call for imaginative action on the part of local Unit Commanders. It is a sad fact that at present in the PMFs, at the local of Platoon Commanders level, we have a preponderance of elderly people. They are professionally very sound but can not react favourably to some of these measures. The need to upgrade the quality of leadership at the cutting edge level by induction of youth can not be over-emphasised.

There is need to rationalise the deployment of security forces. This should be task-oriented and to be determined by the professionals. There is a tendency to flood an area with security forces without a clear-cut objective. Such deployment create more problems and give very little operational advantage. The emphasis should shift to quality rather than a quantity. Well rested, well-trained and well-briefed personnel in small numbers in waves at short intervals will achieve more results than a stagnating large body of men located in an area with no specific work on hand. Inactivity will breed sloth which in due course will create inefficiency. When the need arises, these forces will be found to perform below par. If the operations of security forces in disturbed areas are rationalise don these lines, HUMAN RIGHTS implementation will take care of itself automatically.

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